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This article examines the effectiveness of the 
Missouri Quality Jobs Program (MQJP), the 
declared purpose of which is to “(f)acilitate the 
creation of quality jobs by targeted business 
projects” by awarding tax credits in support of 
qualifying projects.
1
  Tax credit programs such as 
the MQJP are quite common around the country and 
are touted by state economic development agencies 
as important components of their development 
efforts. Nonetheless, there is little evidence that 
targeted tax credits and similar policies are effective 
in spurring economic development and 
employment.
2
  In fact, one recent study of 
employment tax credits in Michigan found that the 
state’s MEGA tax credits were sometimes 
responsible for losses in overall employment.
3
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For development tax credits to work there must be 
some market failures, such as imperfect capital 
markets or agglomeration economies, that create a 
gap between the actual and efficient levels of local 
employment. If there are such market failures, the 
argument goes, then there might be room for a 
properly structured program that would use state 
money to direct resources to close the employment 
gaps. Broadly speaking, therefore, if a tax credit 
program fails to deliver on promised jobs, it was 
either because market failures were not significant 
drags on employment or because the program was 
not structured properly. On the heels of the 
aforementioned history of failure of these programs, 
significant improvements have been made in how 
they are administered.
4
  Most notably, recent 
incarnations of state tax credit programs are 
designed with much greater accountability to ensure 
a closer link between promised and realized new 
jobs at firms receiving the tax credits.  
 
In many respects, the MQJP has been ahead of the 
curve in terms of accountability in that it includes 
provisions for cancelling tax credits in the event that 
job-creation thresholds are not met, which it did for 
33 projects in 2012.
5
  In addition, despite the 
extremely weak national economy following the 
launch of the MQJP, Missouri has so far maintained 
program accountability, thereby bucking the 
tendency for governments to erode accountability 
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during difficult economic times.
6
 Given its relatively 
sound structure, therefore, the success or failure of 
the MQJP in delivering on employment creation is 
likely attributable to the extent to which it is based 
on solid economic efficiency grounds rather than on 
the soundness of its administration.
7
   
 
 
The Program and its Promises 
 
Tax credits have been awarded under the MQJP 
since 2006 and are distributed under three business 
sub-categories—small/expanding, technology, and 
high-impact—each with its own set of eligibility 
criteria and program benefits. By 2012, the number 
and total value of tax-credit authorizations were both 
more than double their 2006 levels, although this 
trend was interrupted a great deal by the national 
recession of 2008-09 (Figure 1).
8
   
 
The increase in the anticipated number of new jobs 
at recipient firms roughly doubled between 2006 and 
2012, although, as shown in Figure 2, the number of 
actual new jobs is, so far, well short of what had 
been anticipated when the credits were authorized. 
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The most recent claims made by the Missouri 
Department of Economic Development (DED) about 
the direct effects (new jobs at firms that were 
awarded tax credits) and indirect effects (spinoff and 
multiplier effects) of the MQJP are contained in the 
program’s 2012 annual report.
9
  At the end of 2012, 
there were 220 active supported projects, 73 of 
which were newly authorized in 2012. The DED 
claims that projects authorized through 2011 were 
directly responsible for 10,137 actual new jobs by 
the end of 2012—with more to come as the projects 
progress—and that the 73 new projects are 
anticipated to directly generate another 7,054 new 
jobs in five years time. After plugging their 
estimates of direct job growth into their forecasting 
model, DED arrives at the claim that the tax credits 
awarded through 2012 will have created 50,096 jobs 
(directly and indirectly) by 2020, or 118 jobs for 
each million dollars in tax credits.  
 
There are a number of reasons to doubt the DED’s 
claims about the effects of the MQJP. With regard to 
direct job creation, the DED is being naïve, or 
perhaps narcissistic, in assuming that every new job 
supported by the program exists only because of the 
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Figure 2. New Jobs at Recipient Firms Under the Missouri Quality Jobs Program
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Figure 1. Tax Credit Authorizations Under the Missouri Quality Jobs Program
* Through October 2012. Source: Missouri Department of Economic Development.




program and that the eventual number of direct jobs 
created is the same as the number claimed when the 
tax credits were authorized. These assumptions fly in 
the face of logic and the evidence for similar 
programs.
10
 Perhaps even more absurd is how the 
DED presumes that none of the new jobs are filled 
by workers who were already employed elsewhere in 
Missouri.
11
   
 
As for the broader indirect effects, the DED relies on 
the belief that the reshuffling of employment that 
occurs between subsidized and unsubsidized firms 
must be greatly outweighed by large spinoff and 
multiplier effects. This belief is embedded into the 
DED’s Regional Economic Models, Inc. (REMI) 
forecasting model which, despite a veneer of 
quantitative detachment, is simply a mathematical 
specification of the DED’s prior beliefs about how 
the economy works.
12
  More precisely, the primary 
sources of the indirect gains predicted by the REMI 
forecasting model are illusive multiplier effects that 
are believed to dominate the substitution effects 
across firms and communities.
13
  This notion is, to 
say the least, extremely controversial among 
economists in that regional forecasting models are 
afflicted with many of the same problems as the 
outdated national forecasting models from the 1960s 
and 1970s they are based on.
14
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Missouri employers, then it is necessary to know 
what happened to those firms. Because the subsidy 
to one employer makes it difficult for unsubsidized 
employers to compete for local workers, these 
unsubsidized firms might downsize, shut down, or 
relocate, thereby further eroding the alleged direct 
job gains.   
 
These substitution effects are not captured very well, 
if at all, by the DED’s forecasting model. According 
to the DED’s model, however, these unknown and 
unaccounted for substitution effects will be more 
than offset by spinoff and multiplier effects. 
Fortunately, it is no longer necessary to rely on the 
DED’s claims about the current and future effects of 
the program because the MQJP has been in place for 
several years. It is, therefore, possible to compare 
actual employment outcomes in Missouri against 





As a practical matter, it is not possible to trace the 
various employment effects of a tax credit 
authorization back their source, so it is necessary to 
instead look at aggregate employment. Therefore, I 
used data on private employment for Missouri 
counties for 1998-2011, with the objective of 
identifying statistical patterns between levels of 
employment and the amount of tax credits received 
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by firms in the counties.
15
  To detect these patterns, I 
estimated baseline levels of employment, controlling 
for the business cycle and county-level trends. Any 
deviations from these baselines that are related to the 
receipt of MQJP tax credits might then be attributed 
to the program. County economies do not operate in 
isolation, so I also looked for the effects that a 
county might experience because firms in 
neighboring counties received tax credits, and 
whether a county is in a broader metropolitan area. 
Note that my estimates are of the net effects of tax 
credits and do not distinguish between direct, 
indirect, spinoff, or multiplier effects. 
 
My estimation results indicate that tax credits had 
positive and statistically significant effects on 
employment in counties whose firms received tax 
credits under the MQJP. These effects were 
significant only through the third year after the tax 
credits were authorized, however, and were typically 
offset by negative and statistically significant effects 
on neighboring counties. The picture is complicated 
somewhat when looking at counties within metro 
areas because these counties’ labor markets are 
closely integrated. As a result of this integration, the 
short-run employment gains from tax credits can 
also be felt by neighboring counties, although the 
negative longer-run effects on neighbors are 
amplified.  
  
Figure 3 illustrates the average five-year effects of 
tax credits under the MQJP. These effects were 
obtained by applying the estimated effects described 
above to the actual allocation of tax credits across 
Missouri counties.
16
  In the figure, the solid bars are 
the employment effects on the county whose firms 
received the credits, the dashed bars are the effects 
on the receiving counties’ neighbors, and the solid 
line is the net effect. Each of these is measured in 
terms of the average effect of $1 million dollars in 
tax credits. According to Figure 3, tax credits led to 
a net increase in state employment only during the 
year of authorization and the following year. 
Specifically, in the year of authorization, tax credits 
led to 128 more jobs per $1 million in the recipient 
counties, but a loss of 110 jobs per $1 million in 
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neighboring counties. In the year following 
authorization, recipient counties and their neighbors 
both tended to see increased employment: 249 and 
82 jobs per $1 million, respectively. Beyond this 
initial start-up period, however, average job gains in 
receiving counties were more than offset by job 
losses in neighboring counties; the net effects were 
losses of 42 and 50 jobs per $1 million in tax credits 
during the second and third years after authorization. 
By the fourth year after authorization, there were no 
statistically significant effects on the recipient 
counties’ employment, but neighbors tended to have 





The MQJP has been in place long enough to obtain 
statistical evidence of its effects on the communities 
with firms receiving tax credits under the program. 
In the short run—the first two years—tax credits are 
associated with job gains in the recipient county and 
its neighbors. Over the medium run (the next two 
years), however, the recipient county gains 
employment only at the expense of its neighbors, 
and there is a net loss of jobs. At the beginning of 
the long run—the fourth year after authorization—
there are no longer any significant job gains in the 
recipient county, but the market distortions created 
by the tax credits mean that there are still significant 
job losses in neighboring counties. 
 
It’s not possible given the data available to estimate 
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Figure 3. The Effect of Tax Credits by Authorization Year
Years since authorization




run, but it is difficult to imagine that the trend 
reverses itself to result in anything close to the 
DED’s projection of 118 new jobs per million 
dollars of tax credits. The more likely best-case 
scenario is that the employment distortions 
eventually work themselves out and the net effect of 
the tax credits approximates zero.  
 
 
